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MICHIGAN

LAW REVIEW
VoL. XVIII.
AN ACCOUNT

DECEMBER, i919

NO. 2

OF SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERI-

MENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF TRADE-MARK
INFRINGEMENT

should be regarded as a continuation of an article published in this Riwiw in June, 191o, entitled, "THe UNWARY
PURCHASER, A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY Oi T0wD-MARM

~HIS
.

INVRINGEMENT."'

In that'article it was asserted that while there is no serious dispute

about the rule of law in trade-mark infringement cases, the application of it occasions much difficulty. The principle is general and
without exception. Infringement occurs whenever two marks resemble each other sufficiently to make it probable that the ordinary retail buyer, exercising no more care than such persons usually
do in purchasing, will be deceived.
This rule in various forms of phraseology has .been laid down
of
many times; probably never better than Judge Jenkins' expression
2
Company.
Mills
Flour
it in Pillsbury v. Pillsbury-Washburn
18 .-MIcHmAw LAw REVIEW 614.
"The question, hdwever, is of resemblances, not of differences. A test which Spplies only after the deviations have been pointed out favors the counterfeit. We -think
it clear beyond reasonable doubt that the simulation is such as to deceive the ordinary
purchaser desiring to buy the flour of the appellee into purchasing the flour thus putupon the market by the appellants. We must remember, in considering this and like
cases, that the purchaser of goods, with respect to brands by which the goods are designated, is not bound to exercise a high degree of care. A specific article of approved
excellence comes to be known by certain catch-words easily retained in memory, or by a
certain picture which -the eye readily recognizes. The purchaser is required only to
use that care which persons ordinarily exercise under like circumstances. He is not
bound to study or reflect; he acts upon the moment. He is without the opportunity of
comparison. It is only when the difference is so gross that no sensible" man, atng on
the instant, would be deceived, that it can be said that the purchaser ought not to be
protected from imposition. Indeed some cases have gone to the length of declaring
that the purchaser has a right to be careless, and that his want of caution in inspecting
brands of goods with which he supposes himself familiar ought not to be allowed to
uphold a simulation of a brand that is designed to work a fraud upon the public. However that may be, the imitation need only to be slight if it attaches to what is most salinet,
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The difficulty khich counsel and courts encounter, is not in the
acceptance of the, rule, but in its application to the instances before
them. The arguable question is always presented-is one mark
sufficiently like another to make it likely that the ordinary customer will be fooled. Counsel on one side asserts that it is,--opposing counsel asserts that it is not, and the judge has to use his own
eyesight and knowledge of people and make up his mind as best he
can, because it is an exceptional case where there is evidence af
actual confusion.
It was suggested that a search through the. literature of modem
experimental psychology might disclose some workable method of
getting light on this problem, because it is a simple on6 in the psychology of recognition. Many interesting discussions arid records
of tests concerning the recognition of colors, tones, pictures, words,
nonsense syllables and the. like were found, but nothing which bore
directly and in a'practical way on the subject under investigation.
But there seemed to be a well recognized scientific method and technique in dealing with purely psychological and perhaps theoretical
problems.
After writing the article in the Rtmw just referred to, I decided
to Side my time, and if a case presented itself in which the experiment seemed worth while, to try it,--to have the question of deceptive similarity between marks determined in a psychological labordtory and to see if a court would pay any attention to the results.3
for the usual inattention of a puichaser renders a good will precarious if exposed to
imposition"
64 Fed. 84, 847.
3Thr
testimony of experts in trade-mark cases has loig been a debated question.
Expert witnesses were called compurgators by Lord Justice Fry, (Turtor v. Turton, 4a
L. R. Ch. Div. 128, 6x L. T. 571, 58o). Their testimony was adversely commented on in
I'ennessy v. Dompe, ig R. P. C., 331, 339.
Payton v. Snelring, 17 L P. C., 628, 635.
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Crooks, z8 R P. C., ray.
Addley Bourne v. Swan, 2o R. P. C., os, rx8.
Singer .Mfg Co. v. British Empire Co., 20 P- P. C., 313, 3x9.
Goodwin v. Ivory Sbap Co.,'x8 IL P. C., 389, 392.
Expert testimony has, however, been received in many cases without objection:
Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall., Six, 53o.
Morse v. Worrell, io Phila., 168; P. & S., 8, 9, x3.
Williams V. Brooks, So Conn., 270'.
In re Worthington's T. M. L R. 14 Ch. Div. 8.
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, a58.
Califor!ia Fig "Syrup Co. v. Taylor's Drug Co., 14 P- P. C., 341, 346.
Siegert v. FindWfer 38 L. T. (N. S.) 349, 352.
Hennessy v. Keating, 25 R. P. C.
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13.

Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co. v. Scotish Co., 26 R. P. C. xoS, xia.
It was commented on in Cook v. Starkweather, 13 Abb. Pr., 400.
New equity rule 48 expressly contemplates the testimony of expert witnesses in
trade-mark cases, though what sort of experts is undisclosed.
It is well known that Mr. Justice Lurton took a prominent part in the drafting of
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In 1915 a case arose which seemed to offer a fair field for the
attempt to see if the experimental psychologist could hed any light

on-the situation. The question to be decided was whether the word
"Chero-Cola" was enough like the word "Coca-Cola" to 'come

within the prohibition of Act of Congress of February 20, 1905,
which provides, Se~tion 5, that no mark shall be registered, "Which
so nearly resembles a registered or known trade-mark owned and in
use by another and appropriated to merchandise of the same descriptive properties as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake in
the mind of the jublic or to deceive purchasers."
The goods being the same in character, the only question was,-"

whether the names infringed. There was evidence of actual confusion. Mail, express and freight directed'to one party had been delivered to the other. Telephone calls were confused; but the answer
to this was obvious,--mail is frequently confused by the stupidity of
the postal authorities without reference to resemblances in .namesIt is a matter of common experience to get the wrong number on the,
telephone and to get another mans express package. It would.add
considerably to the weight of the argument that such confusion as
(id ixist was caused by the resemblance between the names, if icould be -shown by recognized scientific methods that the names were
in fact confusing. Indeed this was the issue in the case.
Richard H. Paynter, Jr., assistait in the laboratory of Applied
Psychology at Columbia University, was given ihe two names and
asked to consider the question of resetnblence anid possible confusion between them, as a problem in experimeital psychology, to
test .the question by recognized laboiratory methods and to confine
himself in its solution to the use of established technique. Mr.
Paynter submitted a report, of which the following is a transcript :INTRODUCTION
This is a report of a series of psychological experiments conducted
to investigate, the deceptive similarity or likelihood of confusion in
visual appearance and in sound between the word trade-marks "CocaCola" and "Chero-Cola." The report also compares the likelihood
of confusion between these words with that found to exist between
word trade-marks that have been held in judicial proceedings to
conflict and with others that have been held not to conflict. Two
these rules and that he spent considerable time in England in gathering the experience
of the English courts under the practice there in vogue; and the probabilities are that
what he had in mind in referring to expert witnesses in trade-mark cases were the
trade experts so commonly used in English courts in what is known as passing off cases.
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distinct methods were employed in the investigation: the recognition
or identification method, and the method of relative position. Four
separate experiments were conducted, three with recognition and one
with relative position. The recognition experiments were on confusion in visual appearance, and the relative position experiment was
on confusion in sound. There was found to be actual confusion
between "Cbca-Cola"' and "Chero-Cola" in visual appearance. The
likelihood of confusion between them in visual appearance and in
sound is greater than the average likelihood of confusion of the
non-infringing marks, and of the infringing marks in each of these
respects. In visual appearance "Coca-Cola"-"Chero-Cola" ties
with a non-infringement pair of marks for third most confusing position; it is less confusing than one non-infringement and one infringement; but it is more confusing than four infringements and two noninfringements. ,In sound-confusion it ties with an infringement for
third most confusing position; it is less confusing than two infringements; and more confusing than two infringements and four noninfringements.

EXPERIMENTS
A. VISUAL RtCOGNITIVz CONFUSION
I. GZNERAI PROCEDURE AND TECHNIQUE. The visual recognition

or identification method was used because it involves the same mental
process as that'employed in daily life by the ordinary purchaser in
buying a bottle of "Coca-Cola." In ordinary transactions of business
*here the article is sold across the counter, the purchaser examines
the article to see if it is what he wants, or whether it is the same as
that which he has known' or bought liefore. In deciding this matter,
the purchaser is guided by recognition or identification of the article
as a whole, by certain, features of it, or by a combination of both
these methods. It often happens, however, that a prospective purchaser has heard or seen only the word trade-mark, but not the
article itself nor its container. In such cases he has to rely on his
memory of just the word trade-mark in identifying the article.
Likewise, the observer or individual in the experiment has to rely on
his memory of the word trade-mark in order to tell whether or not
what is before him now is the original mark that he has just seen.
The task assigned to him in the experiment was simply to indicate
whether the words before him were just shown to him.
The individual who submitted himself to do the recognition experiment was shown in the presentation 20 slips of paper on each
of which was typewritten a word trade-mark, or a word trade-mark
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and the name of its commodity. These slips were presented one at
a time at the uniform rate of one a second. They were presented
by the writer who conducted all the experiments. Fifteen seconds
after the exposure of the last slip in the presentation, the test set
of slips was given to the observer. The test consisted of 40 slips,
and from it the observer was asked to pick out thbse that he recognized as having just been seen and those that had not been seen.
There were two variations of the formation of the test, according to
the problem of the experiment. When the problem was to compare
the confusion between the words "Coca-Cola"! and "Chero-Cola."
"Coca-Cola" appeared in the preseptation, whereas the imitation
"Chero-Cola" appeared in the test together with 19 marks which were
duplicates of 19 shown in the presentation, and 2o marks which were
new, i. e., they had not been shown in the ptesentation. When the
problem was to compare the confusion of the imitation "Chero-Cola"
with that of nine other litigated imitations, "Coca-Cola" appeared in
the presentation, whereas "Chero-Cola" appeared in the test together
with these nine imitations, ten duplicates of the remaining ten
marks, shown in the presentation, and 2o new marks. In all these
experiments "Coca-Cola" was shown in the presentation,,but in the
test where it did not appear the observer had to decide whether he
had seen "Chero-Cola" which was not shown in the presentation.
If he decided that he had seen the imitation he was confusing it with
the original; if he decided that he had not seen the imitation he was
4
not confusing it with the original. Where the comparison was made
name of the article or commodity
the
with other litigated imitations
are two experiments where
There
trade-mark.
appeared with each
trade-marks without, and
the
showing
one
made,
was
comparison
no
the other with the names of their articles. It should be stated here,
however, that although the words in the recognition experiments
entered the mind of the observer through vision, that not only did
similarity in visual appearance, but also in sound, linguistic formation, and meaning or significance contribute to confusion.
The following directions were given to each observer before he
did the experiment:
"You are going to be shown one at-a time a number of ordinary
' These two statements are not strictly accurate, as they do not take into consideration the possibility of the presence of a very small number of obselrvers who would not
have been able to recognize "Coca-Cola," and in whom the perception of "Chero-Cola"
would not recall "Coca-Cola." Accounting for this factor would introduce no significant
These observers would be guessing in recognizing
change in the data or conclusions.
whether they had seen "Chero-Cola" and would be in error about 5o per cent. of the
cases, thereby influencing equally the correct and incorrect recognitions of "Chero-Cols."
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word trade-marks like "Uneeda," "Garford," and "Celluloid." (In
the experiments where the trade-marks were used with the names
of the articles, the observer was told of this and the examples were
given as "Uneeda Biscuit," "Garford Automobile," etc.) You are
to-read all the words on each slip of paper. Read them naturally as
though you were reading an advertisement in a magazine or. in a
street car. Fifteen seconds after you have been shown the last mark,
you will be given a second set (the test) and asked to pick out thpse
marks you have just seen in the presentation and those which you
have not seen. You will be further asked to sort the marks into six
piles, according to the degree of your confidence. or certainty of your
recognition of the marks. There are three degrees of certainty for
the marks that are recognized as seen, and three similar degrees for
those that are recognized as not seen. The three degrees are "absolutely certain," "reasonably certain," -and "faint idea." (After the
observer had indicated his recognitions of ll the marks in -the test,
he was asked how familiar he had been with the word "Coca-Cola");
Would you say you had been "perfectly familiar," "moderately fam-.
filari" -"just familiar.," or "unfamiliar" with the word -Coca-Cola"
befQre you did this experiment?"
Thus, three important facts were obtained from the experiment on
each observer. The first fact was, whether or not he confused
"Chero-Cola" with "Coca-Cola." The second fact was, how confident he was that he was correct, or whether he was in doubt about.
his recognition. 'And the third fact was,*how familiar he had been
in daily life with the word "Coca-Cola. ' The questiqn.of visual confusion will then be determined by the data from these three sources
of information.
Each observer did only one experiment; and he did not do the
same experiment more than once. The observer was not informed
of the purpose of the experiment, nor did he know beforehand that
an original tride-mark would be replaced by an imitation in the test.
Furthermore, nothing was done to cause the observer to have any
suspicion that a substitution had been made. The task set the observer in the experiment was not arduous, nor unDleasant. The experiment was done with the observer's own free will. No prize or
reward was offerL-d for the" highest individual Tecord. After each
observer did the experiment the marks in both the presentation and
test were thoroughly shuffled. As their positions in both-series were
thus determined by chance, no mark was given undue prominence by
its position.
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Ninety ordinary individuals were employed as observers in the
recognition experiments. They represented more thani 6o different
professions and occupations. Their ages were generally between 20
and 45. The individuals that did the experiments represent a random picking from ordinary individuals that resided in New York
City in the month of July, 1915. No effort was made to obtain exceptionally bright or exceptionally dull individuals,
All the trade-marks or trade-names studied in the experiments are
used or have been used in commerce. When the names-of the articles
are used in the experiments in connection with the marks, they are
the names of the same articles or commodities on which the marks
have actually been used. The names of the goods represent many
classes of goods of various descriptive properties. In the presentation no mark nor name of a commodity was the same -as any other.
The names of the commodities of the original marks and their respective imitations were identical. The 20 new marks and tie names
of their commodities were all different from the others, either in the
test or presentation.
The marks and names of the commodities were all typewritten in
the same kind of type. The experiments did not reproduce the style,
coloring, or size of the.marks or names of the commodities as used on
the goods or in advertisements. The color of the ink used was black;
and great care was taken in typewriting the words to keep the blackness of the ink the same for all letters. All the words were fypewritten on the same kind of white paper. Each slip of paper was two and
three-quarters by four and one-quarter inches in size. When the
name of the commodity was used it appeared on the next line directly
beneath the mark. All the words appeared in the second horizontal
quarter from the top of the slip.
2. REsuLTs
a. Experiment with One Imitation Not Showing the Name of the
Article. The problem in this experiment is to determine the likelihood of visual confusion between the words "Coca-Cola" and
"Chero-Cola," when the marks are not accompanied by the common
name ofthe commodity "Soft Drink." The word "Coca-Cola" appeared in the presentation; the test included the word "Chero-C6la,".
19 duplicate marks of 19 shown in the presentation, and 20 new
marks. Table I presents the number and per cent of 4o observers
that confused the word "Chero-Cola" with "Coca-Cola." Elev en or
28 per cent of the group of observers confused or mistook "CheroCola" for "Coca-Cola." Approximately one out of every three ob-
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servers actually takes the word "Chero-Cola" to be "Coca-Cola."
Of the ii deceived by "Chero-Cola" nine were "absolutely certain,"
one "reasonably certain," and one had a "faint idea" that they had
seen it. Thus most of the observers mistaken were quite confident
that they were correct. Moreover, nine of those confused by "CheroCola" were "perfectly familiar," and two "moderately familiar" with
the original trade-mark "Coca-Cola." It is seen from this that observers even very familiar with the'word "Coda-Cola" were deceived
by the imitation "Chero-Cola."
Throughout this investigation the figure representing the per cent
of the individuals in a group confused -byan imitation is not absolute. That is, it does not mean that just this per cent of observers
under the multitudinous varying conditions of every day life will be
confused. But the percentage of confusion is, however, a scientific
measure depending on the observer's memory of the original mark
and its similarity to the imitative mark.
TABIz I

The number and per cent of 4o observers that confused the word
"Chero-Cola" with "Coca-Cola"
Confused
Trade-marks
No.. of Observers
Percent
Imitation
Number
Original
28
II
40
Coca-Cola Chero-Cola
b. ..6xperiment With One Imitation Showing the Name of the
Article:
TABAin

II

The number and percent of 25 observers that confused the word
"Chero-Cola" with "Coca-Cola" when they are applied to the words
"'Soft Drink"
Trade-Marks Name of Article Confused
Number Percent
Original Imitation
68
17
Coca-Cola "Chero-Cola Soft Drink

No. of Observers
25

.Theproblem of this experiment is to determine the likelihood of
visual confusion between the words "Coca-Cola Soft Drink" and
"Chero-Cola Soft Drink." There is no other difference in experimental technique between this experiment and the previous one,
except thaft here each mark is used in connection with the name of
its commodity. Table II gives the number and per cent of 25 ob-
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servers that confused the words "Chero-Cola Soft Drink" with
"Coca-Cola Soft Drink."
Seventeen or 68 per cent of the group confused "Chero-Cola Soft
Drink" with "Coca-Cola Soft Drink." When used in connection
with the words "Soft Drink" two out of every three observers take
"Chero-Cola" for ."Coca-Cola." Of the 17 deceived by "CheroCola" 12 were "absolutely certain," two "reasonably certain," and
three had a "faint idea" that they had seen it. Moreover, 14 of those
confused were "perfectly familiar," two "moderately familiar," and
one "just familiar" with the original mark "Coca-Cola." As in Table
I-the observers in Table II were nearly all quite confident of their
false recognitions of the imitation, and also very familiar with the
word "Coca-Cola."
The figures in Table II show about two and one-half times as much
confusion as do those in Table I. It is the addition of the name of
the commodity to both the original and imitative marks that furnishes an explanation for this increase. As the observers in the
present experiment had to read in the presentation the words "CocaCola Soft Drink" in the same time that those in the previous expriment had to read just the word "Coca-Cola," the word "Coca-Cola"
m the former group not being so well perceived, was not so firmly
established as in the minds of those of the latter group. Having to
contend with a weaker mental impression of "Coca-Cola" confusion
with "Chero-Cola" was more likely. Furthermore, as the two perceptions "Coca-Cola Soft Drink" and "Chero-Cola Soft Drink" are
relatively more similar than the two perceptions "Coca-Cola" and
"Chef6-Cola," confusion between the former is hence greater.
c. Experiment with zo Imitaltions Showing the Names of the
Article.
The problem in the present experiment is to compare the likelihood of visual confusion between the words "Coca-Cola Soft
Drink" and "Chero-Cola Soft Drink," with the likelihood of visual
confusion found to exist between other pairs of similar word trademarks that had been the subject of actual adjudication of infringement or non-infringement. Nine legal decisions" on the similarity
of word trade-marks were selected for comparison. Five were adOHoleproof, Knotair, hosiery; Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., xgo Fed.
Rep., 6o6 (U. S. Cir. Ct.).
Grape-Nuts, Grain-Hearts, cereal food; Postum Cereal Food Co., Ltd. v. American
Health Food Co., xis Fed. Rep., 848 (U. S. Cir. Ct. of App.).
Cascarets, Castorets, remedy; Sterling Remedy Co. v. Spermine Medical Co., x2
Fed. Rep., zooo (U. S. Cir. Ct. of App.).
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judications of infrinjgement, in which the use of the imitative marks
was enjoined, and four were adjudications of non-infringement, in
which injunctions against the use of the alleged ille,al imitations
were refused. In selecting these decisions two principles were followed: First, that the original mark in the decision should be widely
known; and second, that no other circumstance or reason than that
of similarity between the word trade-marks should determine the
point of infringement or non-infringement in the decision.
The first'principle was set-up because the word "Coca-Cola" is
widely known, and is pretty familiar to a great many individuals in
New York City, where all the experiments were .conducted. And
furthermore, because an imitation would cause less confusion in
the case of a more familiar original mark than in the case of a less
familiar original, a comparison of the confusion caused by their respective imitations would unfairly show relatively greater confusion
for the imitation of the less familiar original. Thus, the confusion
brought about by the imitation of "Coca-Cola' will be properly compared with the confusion brought about by infringing and non-infringing imitations, if their originals are approximately as wellknown as "Coca-Cola." It should be stated here, however, that not
all the decisions studied have original marks as well-known as "CocaCola." These marks will receive separate treatment.
The second principle was set up for two reasons. The first was
that the experiment measures visual confusion of just word trademarks. The second was that, if various other factors such as the
question of the validity of the trade-marks, unclean hands, similarity
of the type, color, or other features of the label or package entered
in the decisions and operated to influence the point of infringement
or non-infringement, we could not properly compare the experimental results of these complicated decisions with each other, nor
with simple decisions of confusion of just word trade-marks, nor
with "Chero-Cola." It is obvious that decisions determined by con
Gold Dust, Gold Drop, washing powder; N. K. Fairbanks Co. v. Luckel, King &
Cake Soap Co., io2 Fed. Rep., 327 (U. S. Cir. Ct. of App.).
Listerine, Listogen, antiseptic; Lamber t Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton, Chemical Corporalion, 5 Trade-Mark Rep., 38, 219 Fed. 325 (U. S. Didt.. C.).
Mother's, Grand-M's, waxing pad; E. A. Bromund Co. v. Columbia Wax Products
Co., 2oo 0. G. xirS (Ct. of App., D. C.).
Sozodont, Kalodont, tooth paste; K. K. handespriv. et al. v. Hall & Ruckel, i955
C. D., 329, x65 0. G., 732 (Ct. of App., D. C.).
Green iliver, Green Ribbon, whisky; Lang v. Green .Riter Distilling Co., i9op C. D.,
476, 148 0. G., 280, 33 App. D. C., So6 (Ct. of App., D. C.).
Club, Chancellor Club, cocktails; In re S. C. Herbst Importing Co., x9o8 C. D.,
383, 134 0. G., 1565, 3o App. D. C., 297 (Ct.'of App., D. C.).
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fusion of word trade-marks plus certain other reasons are not in the
same legal nor psychological categories as those determined simply
by the confusion of just the word trade-marks. The decisions in the
former categories could not be properly given as authorities governing those in the latter, or vice versa.
Notwithstanding the fact that some selection has been made in
obtaining these decisions, no selection was made to obtain decisions
whose trade-marks seemed to have only little likelihood of confusion
or less than that of the imitation of "Coca-Cola." That is;- no judgment was exercised to set forth as very great the confusion caused
by "Chero-Cola" by contrast with imitations that might be expected
to show only a slight degree of confusion. In this respect the decisions represent. a chance or random sampling of infringements and
non-infringements, affording thereby a fair comparison of "CheroCola" with infringements and non-infringements of well-known
original trade-marks in general. In this respect the experimental
method gives a scientific comparison, not .one biased in advance to
argue a decision of infringement against the word "Chero-Cola."
This experiment is the same as the previous one, except for the
presence of io imitations, in the test instead of one. The words
"Chero-Cola Soft Drink" were in the test together with nine other
imitations, ro duplicates, ai2 " new marks.
TABr,

III

The number and per cent of observers confused by the word
"Chero4Cola," and each of the five infringements, and four non-nfringements, when they are applied to the names of their articles. "
Name of Article Confused
Trade-marks
No. P.C.
Imitative
Decision Original
48
24
Tooth Paste
Kalodont
Sozodont
N
46
23
Whisky
Ribbon
Green
River
'Green
I
40
20
Waxing Pad
Grand-Ma's
Mother's
N
1o 40*
Soft Drink
Coca-Cola.- Chero-Cola
34
17
-Chancellor Club Cocktails
Club
I
32
16
Antiseptic
Listogen"
Listerine
1
28
14
Remedy
Castorets
Cascarets
I'
26
13
Powder
Washing
Drop
Gold
Dust
Gold
I
24
12
Hosiery
Holeproof Knotair
N
i8
9
Cereal Food
Grape-Nuts Grain-Hearts
N

*This percentage is reckoned on the basis of aS observers in the group; all the ,other
percentakes are reckoned on the basis of so in the group.
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Table III gives the number and per cent of observers confused by
each 9f the imitationg. The first column in the table shows whether
the imitation in the decision was held to be an infringement (I) or
a non-infringement (N). The second column gives the original
mark in the decision; the third the imitative mark; and the fourth
the name of the commodity to which both the original and imitative
marks were applied. The fifth column gives the number of observers confused; the sixth and last the per ceat confused. The marks
are arranged in an order of confusion from most to least.
"Sozodont-Ka-.lodont," a non-infringement case, is the most confusing pair, 24 observers or 48 per cent of the entire group were
confused. "Green River-Green Ribbon," an infringement, stands
second highest with 46 per cent confused. "Coca-Cola - Chero-Cola"
ties with a non-infringement, "Mother's-Grand Ma's," for the third
most confusing position with 4o per cent confused. The differences
between these four pairs of marks are not large. Of the io observers confused by "Chero-Cola" nine were "absolutely certain," and
one had a "faint idea" that they had seen it. Nine of those confused
by "Chero-Cola" were "perfectly familiar," and one "moderately
As .in the two previous
familiar" with the word "Coca-Cola."
experiments, most of the observers confused were very familiar
with the' word "Coca-Cola," and they were scarcely even doubtTwo imitations are more confusing than
ful in their errors.
"Chero-Cola," one of these is a non-infringing imitation and the
other an infringing. Four infringements and two non-infringements have lower scores than "Coca-Cola--Chero-Cola." It is six
per cent lower than the most confusing infringement "Green RiverGreen Ribbon ;" and 14 per cent higher than the least confusing infringement "Gold Dust-Gold Drop." It is eight per cent lower than
the most confusing non-infringement "Sozodont-Kalodont;" and
22 per cent higher than the lowest non-infringement "Grape Nuts-Grain Hearts."
The original marks in the table that are about as well-known in
New York City as "Coca-Cola" are perhaps "Gold Dust," "GrapeNuts" and "Cascarets." The remaining original marks, with the
exception of "Sozodoit," contain ordinary words which are met
with frequently enough in daily life to be perhaps as familiar as the
three above marks. It seems that the combitiation of the two ordinary words in "Holeproof" puts it also under the latter class of
marks. Let us now compare the scores of the imitations of the
marks of these two classes with the score of "Chero-Cola." It is
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more confusing than the imitation of any of the most widely known
original marks. Two of these imitations are infringements and one
a non-infringement. In order of amount of -confusion these marks
are:
40 per cent.
Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola
28 per cent.
Cascarets--Castorets
26 per cent.
Gold Dust-Gold Drop
Grape-Nuts-Grain Hearts 18 per cent.
"Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" has confused 12 per cent more observers
than "Cascarets-Castorets ;" i4 per cent more than "Gold DustGold Drop;" 'and 2 per cent more than "Grape-Nuts-Grain
Hearts." Of the less well-known original marks one non-infringement "S6zodont-Kalodont," and one infringement 'Green RiverGreep Ribbon" are more confusing. "Mother's-Grand Ma's" a
non-infringement ties with "Coca-Cola--Chero-Cola," and all the'
rest are less confusing than it."
It will be observed than in Table III "Chero-Cola" shows less
confusion than in Table II. In both experiments the marks were
used in connection with the name of the commodity. In Table III
the per cent confused is 40, and in Table II 68 per cent., the difference being 28 per cent. The reason for the decrease in Table III
was that "Chero-Cola" appeared in the test together with nine other
imitations. The fact that the observer was usually confronted with
several imitations before the imitation of "Coca-Cola" appeared, was
in itself a kind of fore-knowledge and warning to beware of imitations. In the experiment of. Table II the presdnce of one imitation
among 39 different marks in the test, 19 being duplicates of what
they had seen and 2o new, would find the observer not expecting to
be fooled by an imitation. In the experiment of TableJIll the presence of io imitations in the -test together. with io duplicates and 20
new marks would, on the contrary, act as a warning-to be more
cautious, wary, and careful in recognizing all marks. The -atural
result followed this latter condition; that is, there was a cutting down
of the confusion caused by "Chero-Cola."
TABLX IV.

The average per cent of observers confused by the word "CheroCola," the five infringements, and four non-infringements, when they
are applied to the names of their articles.
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No. of Decision
5
4

Decision
Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola
Infringement
Non-infringement

Confused Av. P. C.
40
33.2
32.5

If we compute the average percentages of the five infringing
marks, and of -the four non-infringing marks, as in Table IV., we
find that the score of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" is higher than either
average. It is about seven per cent higher. The average for the
infringements is 33.2 per cent, and for the non-infringements 32.5

per cent. The average of the infringements is only 0.7 per cent
higher than the average of the non-infringements.
The most important characteristic of this difference is its small
amount. On the other hand, the largest difference between two infringements, "Green River--Green Ribbon" and "Gold Dust-Gold
Drop" is 2o per cent; and the largest difference ,between two noninfringements, "Sozodont-Kalodont" and "Grape-Nuts-GrainHearts" is 30 per cent. Returning for a moment to Table III, two
non-infringements, three if we include "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola,"
are more confusing than four infringements. The most confusing
imitation is a non-infringement; and three of the four most confusing imitations are non-infringements, including "Coca-Cola-CheroCola." The two least confusing imitations are non-infringements.
The differences within both classes of decisions so enormously outweigh the difference between the classes, that for practical purposes
the difference in confusion between the infringing and non-infringing imitations may be disregarded. Therefore, these decisions are
not entirely reliable or consistent. The experiment, presenting conditions no more difficult or essentially different from those in daily
life, find that there is a likelihood of confusion with all non-infringing imitations which the courts held to show no confusion.
d. Duplicate, and New Trade-Marks and Trade-Names.
This section of the report is devoted to showing how difficult was
the task set the observer in the preceding recognition experiments.
It will be remembered that in the experiments with one imitation,
the test contained 39 additional trade-marks and trade-names; 19 of
which were duplicate marks of 19 shown in the presentation, and
20 were new marks. In the experiments with io imitations, there
were in the test besides these, io duplicate marks, and 2o new marks.
By calculating how well the duplicate and new marks were, recognized, the difficulty of the task set the observer may be shown.
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The following table presents the results of the duplicate and new
marks in the experiment in which appeared one imitation, and in
which all the marks appeared without the names of their commodiTable I.
ties. The data for the imitation "Chero-Cola' are given in
the
studied;
marks
of
number
the
states
V
The first column in Table
the
in
both
observer
the
to
shown
was
second whether the mark
The
(new).
test
the
in
only
or
(duplicate),
'test
presentation and
third column gives the average per cent of observers that correctly
recognized these marks. The duplicates have a score of 8o per cent,
and the new a score of 94 per cent.
TABLZ V.

the
The average per cent of observers that correctly recognized
of
name
the
without
duplicate and new marks, with one imitation
the article.
Average P. C.
Kind of Mark
No. of Marks
19
20

Duplicate
New
Average

so
94
87

than
It is thus easier to tell the marks that have not been seen before
diffithe
represents
cent
per
87
average
final
"The
those that have.
of
culty of the task set the observers. That is, excluding the results
the
all
of
the imitation, the average per cent of correct recognitions
other marks is 87 per cent. The task was perhaps not more difficult
than that which the prevailing conditions in daily life: would offer,
nor so easy that it could be reacted to without error.
TABLz VI.
The average per cent of observers that correctly recognized the
duplicate and new marks, with one imitation with the name of the
article.
Average P. C.
Kind of Mark
No. of Marks
66
Duplicate
19
91
New
20
79
Average
Table VI presents the results of the duplicate and new marks in
the experiment in which one imitation appeared, and in which the
marks were used with the names of their commodities. The data
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for the imitation "Chero-Cola Soft Drink" are given in Table II.
The duplicates have a score of 66 per cent, and the new-marks a
score of 9 r per cent. In Table VI., as also in the preceding table, the
average of the new marks is higher than that of the duplicates. There
is, however, in Table VI. a lower score for the duplicates than in
Table V.; those for the new marks are about the same.
This decrease in per cent of correct recognitions for the duplicates
with the name of the article is explained by the fact that in the same
length of exposure more material in the presentation had to be taken
in than when the mark alone was shown. A weaker mental impression for the duplicates in Table VI. thus caused a drop in the per
cent of correct recognitions. But, adding the name of the article
to the new marks made just a slightly lower change in ability to discrirpinate them. We have already seen above in Table II. that the
relatively shorter time to receive the impression of the original with
the name of the commodity aided in causing more confusion than
did the original mark without it, as in Table I. The final average in
Table VI. is 79 per cent. Although it is eight per cent lower than the
final average in Table V, the task is still of fair difficulty.
TArx VII.
The. average per cent of observers that correctly recognized the
duplicate and new marks, with io imitations with the name of the
article.
No. of Marks
10
20

Kind of Mark
Duplicate
New
Average*

Averag6 P. C.
68
94
85

*This average was obtained by dividing the sum of the 3o separate scores by 30; it
is slightly higher than the average obtained by dividing the sum of the averages of the
duplicate and new scores by two.

Table VII. gives the average per cent of correct recognitions Qf
the duplicate and new marks in the experiment in which Io imitations appeared, and in which the marks were used with the names
of their commodity. The scores of the imitations are given in Tables
III. and IV. The duplicates have a score of 68 per cent, and the new
marks a score of 94 per.cent. As in Tables V. and VI. the average
of the new marks is higher than the average of the duplicates. The
scores in Tables VI and VII. aie for both kinds of marks about the
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represents the
same. The final average 85 9er cent in Table VII.
difficulty of the task.
V., VI.,
The average of the duplicate and new marks in Tables
is.
experiments
the
in
and VII., show that the task set the observer
imitation,
one
the
with
of moderate difficulty. In the experiment
the names of
"Chero-Cola," and when the marks are used without
the duplicate
of
recognitions
correct
the
the articles the average of
one imitawith
the.experiment
In
cent.
per
and new marks is 87
with the
used
are
marks
the
when
and
Drink,"
Soft
tion "Chero-Cola
of the
r.ecognitio.'s
names of the articles the average of the correct
with
experiment
the
In
duplicate and new marks is 79 per cent.
the
of
.nanes
the
with
io Imitations, and when the marks are used
and
uplicate
the.,
-of
recognitions
articles the average of the correct
new marks is 85 per cent.

B. SOUND CONVUSION OF THt IO IMITATIONS MEASURED BY REIATIvZ PosITION

The method of relative position was used to compare the likeliand
hood of confusion in sound between the words "Coca-Cola"
previous
.the
of
"Chero-Cola" with that -between the litigated marks
experiment. This method does not state 'how many' are confused
of their
in sound by the various imitations, but it does give a measure
observer
the
required
It
sounal.
relative differences in confusion of
to the
to arrange the io pairs of litigated marks in a list according
to
likely
is
imitation
the
that
,confusion
of
amount .or magnitude
the
In
cause. Any pair is then measured by its position in the list.
in the
comparison of "Chero-Cola" with the nine imitations, and
that
recognized
is
psychological criticism of their legal decisions it
confusion.
sound
the decisions were not rendered entirely on
,Measurement by relative position was adopted:. first, because
it is a different method from that used in the previous experiment;
second, because there is a certain analogy between the mental processes of the "observer judging relative differences and the mental
processes -inthe minds of the court judging,the question of infringement or non-infringement; and third, because confusion between
octur
the words "Coca-Cola" and "Chero-Cola" is especially likely to
sounds.
their
to
respect
in
under certain actual business conditions
As regards the first point, it would obviously be of much importance if a method different from that employed in visual rec6gnitive
confusion should show that confusion in sound between the words
"Coca-Cola" and "Chero-Cola" was above that of the averages of
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the infringing and non-infringing marks. Confirmation of greater
likelihood of confusion than infringements and non-infringements in
two different respects by two different methods is certainly significant.
As regards the second.point, the mental processes of the observer
comparing relative differences in sound confusion are essentially
and very siniilar to those in the minds of judges comparing the sound
confusion of a pair'of marks in a case in court with that of marks
adjudicated infringement and non-infringement. Although there
are resemblances between the mental conditions that give the experimental data and those that give the legal decisions, there are differences between this experimental method and the legal procedure that
have greater significance. With measurement by relative position
the accuracy or math. matipal validity is higher. In employing a
far greater number of observers the arrangement is much less likely
to be the result of chance bias of a few individuals. In. the average
of a large number of judgments chance bias in any one direction is
cancelled, and the result represents the general tendency of all the
observers.
Furthermore, the observers are entirely disinterested in the outcome of the experiment. They do not know which marks have been
adjudicated infringement or non-infringement, nor that any pair of
marks is being especially investigated. Not knowing that the experiment is .conducted for a pending case the jidgments of the
observers are consequently without prejudice to either plaintiff or
defendant. On the other hand, with legal procedure not more than
a few judges pass on the decision; and their-judgments tend to some
extent to be influenced by the abilities of contending counsel to magnify the differences and increase the similarities of the trade-marks.
Measurement by relative position gives an exact measure, whereas
a judicial decision throws a case into one of two categories, illdefined and without quantitative significance. . It is thus clear that
this experimental method is far superior to the present legal procedure.
As regards the last point, the probability of confusion in sound
or pronunciation between the words "Coca-Cola' and "Chero-Cola"
is considered because it is in this respect that a purchaser asking for
a glass of "Coca-Cola" from the dispenser of the drink at the fountain is likely to be fooled. The purchaser under these conditions does
not usually see the label .on the bottle or.its crown, and he can not
identify the drink by its trade-mark. Assuming that the dispenser
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is acting honestly in listening to his customer's request, and in fulfilling what he believes to be .that request, confusion between the
words "Coca-Cola" and "Chero-Cola" is most likely in sound or
pronunciation alone.
Each observer was given an envelope and a sheet of directions.
Enclosed in the envelope were io slips of white paper, on each of
which appeared two trade-marks. The slips of paper were -the same
size as those of the previous experiments; and the marks were all
typewritten in black ink. The name of the article or commodity
did not appear with the trade-mark. The directions are as follows:
"Please arrange in serial order as well as .you can thie enclosed
slips of paper according to the following instructions:
"Each slip contains- two trade-marks of a common article. The
upper is the original trade-mark, and the lower is the imitation of it.
"The different pairs of trade-marks on the different slips vary in
their likelihood of confusion, or in their deceptive similarity, or in
the likelihood that the imitation trade-mark will be mistaken for the
original. This confusion may be due to the appearanceof the tt-ademarks, their sound, their.linguisticformation, their meaning or significance, or any combination of these four factors. Neglect, however, all of these four factors except that of sound.

"Arrange the slips according to the likelihood of confusion in just

the sound of the trade-marks: Put on the top of the pile the slip
containing the imitation which shows the greatest likelihood of confusion in sound and on the bottom the slip containing the imitation
which shows the least likelihood of confusion in sound. Between

the top slip and the bottom put in order those slips containing imitations which show intervening degrees of likelihood of confusion in

sound.

. "In arranging the slips consider the trade-marks as if you have
had no previous experience with them."
In addition, the observer was told that there was no time limit,
and that he could take as long as he wished to make the arrangement,
and further that he was allowed to rearrange the order until it satisfied him. To do the experiment usually required about five minutes.
No information was given as to the purpose of the experiment.
Fifty observers assisted in the task of judging the trade-marks.
They were mostly students of psychology at Columbia University,
during the month of October, 1915. Some were under-graduates
studying psychology, sonie were graduate students with special training in it, and a few were assistants and instructors of psychology.
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Only four observers had not gone to college, but all these had been
acquainted with psychological experiments. No observer fhat took
part in any of'the recognition experiments acted again in this experiment.
TABrx, VIII.
The grades and probable errors of the word "Chero-Cola."
of the five infringements, and four non-infringements.
Decision
I
I
I
N
I
N
I
N
N

Trade-Mark
Original
Imitative
Cascarets
Castorets
Green River
Green Ribbon
Coca-Cola
Chero-Cola
Listerine
Listogen
Sozodone
Kalodont
Gold Dust
Gold Drop
Grape-Nuts
Grain-Hearts
Club
Chancellor Club
Mother's
Grand-Ma's
Holeproof
. Knotair

Each

Av.

P.E.

1.2

.03
.J3

3.3
3.6
3.7
5.1
5.2
7.0
7.8
8.6
9.5

,I7
.15
.20

.12
.13
.J1

.09
.o8

Table VIII. gives the grades and probable errors of the word
"Chero-Cola," each of the five, infringing, and four non-infringing
imitations. The first column in the table shows whether the imitation in the decision was held to be an infringement (I) or a noninfringement (N). The second column gives the original mark in
the decision.; aid the third the imitative. The fourth column gives
the grade; and fifth and last the probable error of the grade. The
marks are arranged in an order of probable confusion from most to
least. The pair of marks which received the smallest average was
judged to have the greatest likelihood of confusion in sound; the one
which obtained the largest average was judged to have the least
likelihood of confusiorr'in sound.
"Cascarets-Castorets" an infringement has been selected out of
the io pairs of trade-marks as being the most confusing. It was
placed in the first position by 42 observers, and in the second position by 8. Its average grade or position is 1.2. "Green River-Green
Ribbon" stands second with a grade of 3.3. "Coca-Cola-CheroCola" with a grade 3.6 ties with the infringement "Listerine-Listogen" with'a grade 0f-3.7 for-the third most confusing position. The
grade of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" is 0.3 lower than that of "Green
River-Greer. Ribboxi," ando.i higher than that of "Listerine-Listo-
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gen.; These differences are not large. The grade of "Coca-ColaChero-Cola" is 2.4 lower than the grade of the most'confusing infringement "Cascarets-Castorets"; and it is 4.2 higher'than that of
- -- is_1.5
the least confusing infringement "Club-Chancellor Clui.t.
higher than the most confusing non-infringement "Spzo.iit-al.
odont"; and it is 5.9 higher than the grade of the least conf-sing"
The arrangement sfiows
non-infringement "Holeproof-Knotair."
confusing with one inequally
is
that "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola"
and more coninfringements,
two
than
confusing
less
fringement,
fusing then two infringements and all four non-infringements.
A consideration of the probable errors will show that the grades
of confusion of the different pairs of trade-marks have a high degree
of validity. Moreover, the validity itself of the order can be measured. The probable error of the grade 1.2. is 0.03, i. e., the chances
are even that this grade is correct within three hundredths of a
unit. It must, however, be remembered that the chances of the true
grade being far outside this range decreases very rapidly. The probable error of a measure states the unreliability of the measure, or
the probable approximation of the true measure (calculated from
an infinite number, of cases) to the obtained measure (calculated
from 5o cases in this investigation). That the grade 1.2 of "Cascarets-Castorets" is due to chance is entirely negligible. Although
all the remaining probable errors are somewhat larger, they indicate
a high degree of validity of the average grades. The larger probable errors indicate that the order is less certain, and the difference
in confusion 'between one pair of trade-marks and the next on the
list is less. The prbbable error of the grade 3.6 of "Coca-ColaChero-Cola" is o.i7, or the chances are even that this grade is correct within about one fifth of a unit.
The probable" error of the difference 0.3 between the grade 3.6
of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" and the next higher grade of "Green
River-Green Ribbon" will show the chances that "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" deserves a grade as high as that of "Green River-Green
Ribbon." The probable error of the difference 0.3 is 0.21. As the
difference 0.3 is .4 times greater than the probable error of the
difference 0.21, the chances are about 2 to i that "Coca-Cola-CheroCola" does not deserve a grade as high as that of "Green RiverGreen Ribbon." As the difference o.i between the grade of "CocaCola-Chero-Cola" and the next lower grade of "Listerine-Listogen" is covered by the probable errors of the grades, the chances
are even that "Listerine-Listogen" deserves a grade as high as that
of "Coca-Cola- Chero-Cola." The probable error of the difference
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1.5 between the grade of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cole" and the second
lower grade of "Sozodont-Kalodont" is 0.26. As the difference 1.5
is 5.8 times greater than the probable error of the difference o.26,
the chances are over io,ooo to i that "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" does
not deserve a grade as low as that of "Sozodont-Kalodont." Therefore, the chances are 2 to i that "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" does not
deserve a grade as high as that of "Green River-Green Ribbon";
the chances are even that "Listerine-Listogen" deserves a grade as
high as that of "'CocaCola-Chero-Cola"; and the chances are over
i0,ooo to i that "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" does not deserve a grade
as low as that of "Sozodont-Kalodont.:
Of the very well-known original trade-marks "Cascarets-Castorets" alone stands higher than "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola," and "Gold
Dust-Gold Drop" and "Grape-Nuts-Grain-,Hearts!' are both lower.
Of the less well-known original trade-mrks "Green River-Green
Ribbon" stands higher than "Coca-Cola-Chero Cola,' "ListerineListogen" about the same, and all the rest lower. In this relative
position experiment the comparison between these two classes of
trade-marks is not really necessary as the instructions required the
observer to. disregard the factor 6f familiarity with the trade-mearks.
In only three cases did the observer report any difficulty in so doing it.
TABLE IX.

The average grades and probable errors of the word "CheroCola," the five infringements, and four non-infringements.
Number of
Av.
P. B.
Decision
Decisions
3.6
.17
Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola
.I2
4.2
Infringement
5
.JI
7.6
Non-infringement
4
Table IX. gives the average grades of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola,"
of the five infringements, and of the four non-infringements.
"Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" has a higher rank than both the average
of the grades of the infringements and the average of the grades
of the non-infringements. It is o.6 higher than the average of the
infringements, and 4.0 higher than the average of the non-infringements. The average of the infringements is 4.2. and that of the
non-infringements 7.6; their probable errors are 0.12 and.o.II respectively.
The probable error of the difference o.6 between the grade of
Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" and the average of the five infringements
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is o.2i. As the difference o.6 is 2.9 times greater than the pronable
error of the difference 0.21, the chances are i9 to I that "CocaCola-Chero-Cola" does not deserve a grade as low as the average of the five infringements. The probable error of the difference
average
4.0 between the grade of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" and the
of the four non-infringements is o.2o. As the difference 4.0 is 20
times greater than the probable error of the difference o.2o, there
are practically no chances that "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" deserves
a grade as low as the average of the four non-infringements.. "CocaCola-Chero-Cola," therefore, stands with high validity above the
average of the five infringements, and the average of the four noninfringements.
In Table VIII., among the infringements the greatest difference
is 6.6, between "Cascarets-Castorets" with a grade of 1.2, and "Club-,
Chancellor Club" with a grade of 7.8. Among the non-infringements
the greatest difference is 44, between "Sozodont-Kalodont" with
a grade of 5.i and "Holeproof -Knotair" with a grade of 9.5. In
Table IX. the average of the five infringements is 34 higher than
that of the four non-infringements. 'Thus, the differences within
either class of decisions are greater than between them. Two noninfringements, three if we include "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola," are
The two most
more confusing than the lowest infringement.
two least conthe
and
infringements,
are
confusing imitations
In sound confusion the results point
fusing non-infringements.
consequently as did those in visual recognitive confusion to the unreliability and inconsistency of the legal decisions and of the present
legal procedure.' The difference; however, between .the averages of
relthe infringements and non-infringements in sound confusion by
and
confusion,
recognition
ative position is greater than in visual
indicates a greater accuracy of the decisions.
It should be noted here that we can not say that grade 1.2 is three
highest
times as high as gtrade. 3.6, or that the 2nd grade from the
arithmetic
Ordinary
th.
plus the 5th is equal to the 3rd plus the 4
does not apply to measures by relative position.
A comparison of Tables III. and VIII. will show that the positions
in most
of the same pairs of marks in the two lists have changed
did not
-that
pair
only
the
is
cases. "Green River-Green Ribbon"
one-half
only
changed
Cola"
change its position. "Coca-Cola-Chero
of a position, "Holeproof-Knotair" changed one position, "ListerineListogen"' and "Gold Dust-Gold Drol" two positions, 'Grape-NutsGrain-Hearts" and "Club-Chancellor Club" three, "Sozodont-Kalo"Cascardont" four, "Mother's-Grand-M'Ms" five and one-half, and
changed
positions
of
ets-Castorets" six. The average of the number
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for the 1o pairs of marks is 2.7. The lack of exact correspondence
between the positions of *the same pairs of marks in both lists does
not mean that the methods or results are .contradictory or inconsistent. Though in both experiments presentation of material was
through vision, each experiment principally affected two different
senses. Exact correspondence would most likely have existed between the two lists if they were both concerned with measuring the
same thing.
CONCLUSION.
1. The word "Chero-Cola" shows a likelihood of visual confusion with the word "Coca-Cola." With one imitation in the experiment and when the mark is used without the name of the commodity,
28 per cent. of all the observers confuse in visual recognition theword "Chero-Cola" with "Coca-Cola." With one imitation in.the
experiment and when the mark is used with the name of the commodity, 68 per cent, of all the observers confuse in vi'suaJ recognition the -words "Chero-Cola Soft Drink" with Coca-Cola Soft
Drink." With io imitations in the experiment and when the mark
is used with the name of the commodity, 40 per cent. of all the observers confuse in irisual recogfition the words "Chero-Cola Soft
Drink" with "Coca-Cola Soft Drink." Thus, either with or without
the name of the commodity added to the trade-mark, with or without
other imitations present, the word "Chero-Cola" shows a likelihood
of confusion in visual recognition with "Coca-Cola." It should be
observed that the per cent. of likelihood of confusion is not an absolute number representing the exact per cent. of individuals that
would be confused in daily- life. The per cent. holds approximately
only under the simple standardized conditions of the experiment.
2. Most of the observers confused are "absolutely certain" that
they had seen the word "Chero-Cola," and only a few are either
"reasonably certain" or have a "faint idea." That is, most of the
observers put the greatest confidence in their wrong recognitions, and
in so doing testify to or affirm their great belief that they are right.
3. -Most of the observers confused state that they were "perfectly familiar" with the trade-mark "Coca-Cola" before they saw it in
the presentation of the experiment, and only a few were either
"moderately familiar" or "just familiar"; none were "unfamiliar"
with it.
4. The qbnfusibn in visuaj recognition caused by "Chero-Cola"
is greater tan that caused by the imitations of the other three very
very well-known original marks; it is 12 per cent. greater than the
confusion daused by the infringing imitation of "Cascarets," 14 per
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'cent. greater than that of the infringing imiftion of "Gold Dust,"
and 22 per cent. greater than that of the non-ihf ringing imitation of
"Grape-Nuts." "Chero-Cola" has a score of 8 -per cent. less than
the most confusing non-infringement, 6 per cent. less than the most
confusing infringement, ties with another non-infringement, and
has a higher score than four infringements and two non-infringements. The conflasion in the case of "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" is
seven per cent. greater than that of the average of the five infringing
pairs of marks or of the four non-infringing. The average of the
infringements is only 0.7 per cent. higher than that of the noninfringements; practically this is no difference.
'5. As determined -by the average per cent of observers that correctly recognized the duplicate and new marks, the task set the
observer in the experiment is of moderate difficulty. In the three
recognition experiments the average per cents of correct recognitions of the duplicate and new, marks is 87, 79, and 85 per cents.
The figures indicate then that the task is not too arduous nor exceedingly easy.
6. In*measurement of confusion in sound by relative position
"Coca-Cola--Chero-Cola" with a grade of 3.6 (P. E. o.i7) ties
with an infringement for the third most confusing position in the list
of io pairs of litigated trade-marks. It is ranked equally confusing
with one infringement, less confusing than two infringements, and
more confusing than two infringements and all four non-infringements.
7. "Coca-Cola-Chero-Cola" has a higher rank of confusion than
both the average of thd grades of the infringements, and the average
of the grades of the non-infringements. It is with high validity
above the average 4.2 (P. E. o.12) of the five infringements, and
above the average 7.6 (P. E. o.ii) qf the four non-infringements.
This report, for the purpose only of dispensing with formal
proof, by stipulation and subject to objection, was made part of the
record. . It was of course objected to on every ground which diligent
counsel could think of, and, was treated in the argument with much
ingenious pleasantry; but nevertheless it was received, and the court
in itsopinion handed down on March 25, 1919, commented on the
results as follows:
"With reference, however, to the testimony of Paynter found on
pages 497-531 of opposer's record, the examiner is unable t6 agree
with the criticisms made by the applicant. This testimony was included by stipulation of the parties, and in effect consists of various
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psychological experiments conducted by Paynter for the purpose of
investigating the likelihood of confusion in visual appearance and
in sound between the marks "Coca-Cola" and "Chero-Cola." These
experiments proceed on the assumption that the question" of likelihood of confusion in trade is for the most part a question of
psychological fact rather than a question of law, and as such should
lend itself to experimental determination. It is seemingly not
claimed by Paynter that these experiments- are the equivalent of the
actual conditions that obtain in trade. But it is sought to simulate
as near as practicable these conditions in the laboratory. These
experiments are so conducted that (i) the element of personal bias
and interest should be absent; and (2) the law of averages is utilized for the purpose of ascertaining the least probable error of the
observer. This mathematal law of averages, as is well known, is
the common scientific method used to detect errors involved in making observations of fact. These two factors alone should greatly
tend to justify careful consideration of the method used to obtain
them.
"Counsel for applicant objected to these experiments for various
reasons given at the time the testimony of Paynter was introduced.
In effect, applicant contends that the testimony of Paynter and the
experiments identified by him are inadmissible as evidence in this
case. These reasons have been carefully considered by the ecaminek.
Every one of them, however, seems to him to be no more applicable
to these experiments than to an experimental test of a machine made
by interested parties to demonstrate its operativeness or inoperativeness, such, for instance, as is disclosed in the case of Mark v. Green.
awalt.8 Tests of machines for this purpose are recognized as admissible evidence. These objections on this ground are not sustained since they seem to the examiner to go to the weight of the
evidence and not to its admissibility. In tests of machines this office
reserves to itself the right to form its own opinion on the value, if
any, of such evidence, and it is not bound to accept the results stated
to have been olitained. The same procedure seems to the examiner
to -be proper here. The analogue of the experimental machine test
is helpful in considering the objection by the applicant that these
experiments were performed during the. absence of counsel for applicant. Doubtless when this circumstance exists in connection with
the test of a machine it is a factor tending to detract from the proba'138 0. G. 965.
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five force of the testimony offered relative to this test. But the
effect of-this factor should depend upon the nature of the test and
the amount of expense to the other party involved in duplicating the
machine test. For if a duplicate test can easily be made, and if made
by the other party would rebut the effect of this testimony relative
to the experimental test of the machine made i-i camera by the other
party, the absence of the opposing party at these tests should have
less significance than if a test by the opposing party is not practicable, or if practicable, only with great expense or by overcoming
unusual difficulties. Here, however, the experiments could have been
easily reproduced or varied in many ways by the applicant. The
examiner therefore attaches less significance to the absence of the
counsel for applicant at these experiments than does the applicant.
"The examiner regrets that applicant did not reproduce these
experiments or vary them to meet some of the conditions suggested
in some of the objections recited on pages 528-531 of the opposer's
record. If they had been made they might have thrown considerable light on a number of questions to which these experiments
naturally give rise in the mind of anyone who has studied them
carefully. Some of the results of these experiments seem to the
examiner to be at variance with those that he is accustomed to regard as correct. Thus, for instance, in the first two paragraphs
found in the table on page 511 involved, "Coca-Cola" and "CheroCola" are 'stated to be 4o per cent. confusing and "Cascarets" and
"Castorets" only 28 per cent. confusing. It would seem to the examiner that if the percentages were interchanged they would approximate more nearly with what would be obtained from the use of the
ordinary methods. The examiner recognizes, however, that if experiments of this character are capable of establishing accurate and true
results, they would probably show variations from those obtained
from the imperfect methods now used. It therefore follows that
such variations arp not necessarily satisfactory evidence that the
results of the method used are erroneous. At the same time, ordinary caution and prudence require that the accuracy of the methods
involved in these novel experiments be demonstrated by repeated
use and test under various conditions before it would-be safe for this
office to conclude that these variations should be ignored. If"so
tested and used the results may be given a probative force greater
than that which it seems safe to now attach to them.' Some appreciable weight is, however, believed to inhere in and .attach to the~e
experiments for the purpose of showing that there is some reason-
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able likelihood of confusion in trade involved in the concurrent use
of the words 'Coca-Cola' and 'Chero-Cola.' -I
a petition for rehean~ng, contending
T The attorneys for the Chero-Cola Company filed
among other things that Paynter's testimony was incompetent. The rehearing was granted,
the case reargued and an opinion handed down by the Examiner reaffirming his previous conclusion. The Examiner's opinion in part i§ as follows:
"With reference to the testimony filed by the opposer, the testimony of Paynter is
especially criticized (see page x5) because the persons whose acts are referred to by
Paynter were not 'called as witnesses. It is noted, h9wever, that the applicant failed
either to identify oi. call as witnesses the persons referred to by the dealers who testifiedin its behalf. This circumstance, however, does not make incompetent the testimony of either these dealers or the testimony of Paynter as to the acts of others (see
page x5 of brief). "By reason of the conditions under which these acts are performed the latter possess
inherent evidential value. This value is disclosed by the conduct of the person and not
by any testimonial assertions of the latter. In this respect such conduct somewhat resembles spontaneous declarations of persons made under conditions that give to such
declarations the significance of verbal acts. A typical case is an exclamation or statement of an injured person made immediately after the injury. Such conduct is a fact
and like any other fact may be established by the testimony of others, as for instance
the testimony of Paynter. The significance of the fact so established is determined by
the surrounding circumstances. These are disclosed by the test conditions under which
the act was performed. In proportion as these conditions approximate or simulate those
actually existing in trade in the same proportion is the increase of the significance of
these facts.
"The circumstance that the test il ex parte in nature goes to the question of the
weight of the evidence and not to its competency (Greenleaf on Evidenge, t6th -Edition,
Par. x6z, p. (3). page 275). As previously pointed out (see page so of the decision of
March 24, x91g), this is an adverse factor but its significance here seems to the examiner
to be small because (s) of the ease with which similar experiments could be made by
the applicant for the pprpose of rebuttal, and because (v) of the possibility of disclosing
by cross examination of the witness Paynter circumstances tending to lessen the evidential significance of these acts and which may have been incident to such ex parte
presentation. In the mind of the Examiner there is no doubt whatever that, other
things being equal, the act of any such persons, referred to in the Paynter testimony,
possesses an intrinsic evidential value far in excess of any assertion made by the same
person, to thb effect. that he either would or would not be likely to be confused by the
marks under the condition of the test. The substitution of aets for assertions in the
nature of conjecture is the first step toward certainty. These last mentioned conditions
should eliminate personal bias and collateral circumstances that are irrelevant to the
mere question of similarity of the marks. Such circumstances, for instance, are the
appearance of the goods, trie address on the packages, and the like. Any one experienced
in reading testimony in trade-mark cases is familiar with the baneful influence of these
factors and the inherent difficulty of making any proper allowance therefor, even when
it definitely appears that these factors are present.
"The elimination of personal bias and influence of collateral circumstances of the
character just set forth is another important step in the direction of attainment of certainty.
"With reference to the liability of actual confusion between marks by any single
individual experience shows that it varies between quite wide limits. This variability
inherent in the individual is made to closely approach the conduct of the average person by the application of the law of averages. This conduct of the average purchaser
varies between relatively narrow limits and consequently seems to the examiner to be
the only just and practical basis for an adjudication of trade-mark rights which turn
solely on the question of similarity of marks that lie in the twilight zone. The utilization of variable individual conduct as a starting 'point to obtain a standard of reference
for individuals generally is 'illustrated by mortality tables that- are in use by all life
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The foregoing is submitted, not as a thesis in favor of the universal application of laboratory methods to the solution of such problems as this case presented, but as a suggestion of a possible way
of meeting a difficulty which every lawyer of any experience in this
class of cases has found a serious one, and upon which the courts
*thus far have shed very little light.
EDWARD S. RoGRS.
.
Chicago. Ill.
tlhese tables
insurance companies. The certainty between very narrow limits inherent in
magis well known and this certainty is made the basis of business transactions of great
nitude. This utilization of the law of averages applied to individual acts of this character constitutes another important step in the direction of certainty.
"Sufficient has "been indicated to make it seem that the method under consideration
any
should appeal to those persons who are interested in and know the great value of
practical method that could assist those who are compelled to decide doubtful questions
to its
of similarity and who consider the novelty of a method no necessary obstacle
possession of intrinsic merit, but only a reason for closer scrutiny to ascertain whether
sim,t possesses this merit. The great value of certainty and uniformity on questions of
were
ilarity is easily perceived by considering tbe injurious effect on trade if uncertainty
injected into the law of negotiable instruments.
"From what has been said it should be clear that the inability of the examiner to
give a greater weight to the results of the acts of the persons referred to by Paynter,
resides primarily in the difficulty of ascertaining with certainty the question of how close
the conditions of the test approximate those existing in actual trade. These test conditions are necessarily simulations of conditions actually existing and therefore involve
empirical factors. .The presence of the latter do not necessarily render the test conditions unsuitable or unreliable. Iti this respect these test conditions somewhat resemble
tested formulae in which empirical factors are also present. Such formulae after proper
tests are extensively used by engineers on hydraulic and mechanical construction work.
In the absence of an experimental determination of the value of these empirical factors
in the Paynter test, however, some uncertainty in the probative force of the results
obtained seems to be necessarily involved. An allowance has therefore been made by
the examiner. These test conditions, howeleir, inv6lve too many of the fundamentals
found to exist in actual trade to warrant the results of the test being ignored by the
examiner.,

